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Abstract. Anti-malware products are typically evaluated using struc-
tured, automated tests to allow for comparison with other products and
for measuring improved efficiency against specific attacks. We propose
that anti-malware testing would benefit from field studies assessing ef-
fectiveness in more ecologically valid settings. This paper presents our
methodology for conducting a 4-month field study with 50 participants,
including discussion of deployment and data collection, encouraging re-
tention of participants, ethical concerns, and our experience to date.
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1 Introduction
How should the effectiveness of anti-malware software be assessed in practice?
Current strategies typically involve automated testing against standard datasets,
sometimes with automated user profiles to imitate user interaction with security
messages [1]. Even with the more advanced tests that include user profiles, this
assumes that users’ behaviour and all of the variables affecting their computing
environments can be predicted and reflected in these automated profiles.
We suggest that many infections are due to direct or indirect user actions
that allow malware to infect a system. These actions (or inactions) may occur
immediately prior to infection, weeks or months prior to infection, or may even
occur over time so that a combination of actions lead to a vulnerable system
state. These situations would not be accurately reflected in automated testing,
nor would they be identifiable through traditional lab-based user testing.
One alternative is to conduct long-term field studies of anti-malware software
with real users in more ecologically valid settings. By monitoring real usage over
time, one can gain a better understanding of how anti-malware systems are used
and how external factors influence their effectiveness. However, a large number
of confounding variables exist which significantly complicates the data analysis.
In our study, we wanted to provide a common and controlled “clean slate” to
begin the experiment, but somehow allow users to take ownership over their
2system and use it as they would normally, while we monitor the system for signs
of infection.
In this paper, we present our approach to conducting a field trial of an anti-
malware product. Section 2 summarizes related work in anti-malware testing and
conducting field studies of security products. Section 3 describes our method-
ology for conducting the trial, including our approach to selling laptops and
reimbursing participants for their purchase throughout the study. Section 4 dis-
cusses how we addressed ethical and privacy issues, while Section 5 highlights
our experience with this ongoing study. The paper concludes with a discussion
of our anticipated analysis and brief description of a larger scale follow-up study.
2 Background
Although there are currently several methods for evaluating anti-malware prod-
ucts [7], they do not reflect the performance of products in real life. Typical
evaluation methods are based on scanning collected or synthesized malware
along with legitimate programs. While such approaches can measure raw de-
tector accuracy, they cannot take into account factors such as user interactions,
evolving threats, and different environments. One major issue is that the sample
collection is often too small, inappropriate, and unvalidated [8, 9]. Even with a
well-maintained malware collection, testing against such data sets has become
unreliable due to the increased dynamic nature of malware. To partially address
this issue, Vrabec and Harley [13] proposed emulating user interaction with the
system and creating user-specific testing scenarios.
In the broader security community, field studies of computer security are
frequently advocated but are still relatively uncommon in the literature, likely
due to the costs, time demands, and potential security and privacy risks to users.
Recent field studies of security software have mostly involved evaluating the use
of authentication mechanisms [3, 6, 4]. In 2009, Somayaji et al. [11] introduced
the concept of computer security clinical trials. The conceptual proposal was to
evaluate security products using methods and controls similar to those used in
clinical trials of medical products, but no studies have been conducted thus far.
Ethnographic studies examine usage of security systems in the field, but
use qualitative methods such as interviews, diaries, and observation to under-
stand how and why participants interact with computer systems. Botta et al. [2]
conducted an ethnographic study of security professionals, Rode [10] examined
parental behaviour in protecting children’s online safety, Wash [14] used in-
terviews to understand users’ mental models of security, and De Luca et al.
conducted a field observation of ATM usage to evaluate PIN usage [5].
While some of the above studies mention anti-malware usage as a security
measure taken by users, it is not the focus of these studies. To our knowledge,
there are no published user studies focusing specifically on
33 Study Description
The goals of this study are to: (1) determine how phenomena such as the config-
uration of the system, the environment in which it is used and user behavior can
affect the probability of infection of a system; (2) develop an effective methodol-
ogy to evaluate anti-malware products in real-world environment; (3) determine
how malware infects computer systems, and identify sources of malware infec-
tions. The study includes monitoring real-world computer usage through diag-
nostics and logging tools, monthly interviews and questionnaires, and in-depth
investigation of any potential infections.
We are conducting a 4-month field study with 50 participants that were
recruited through posters and newspaper advertisements on campus. A short
online intake questionnaire was used to collect initial demographic information.
Using these profiles, we categorized interested volunteers and randomly chose a
sample from each category in order to have a diverse and representative sample
of users that include students and employees from various fields.
3.1 Equipment
We supplied laptops with identical configuration to the participants. The fol-
lowing software was installed: Windows 7; the antivirus (AV) product to be
evaluated; diagnostics tools, such as HijackThis, ProcessExplorer and Autoruns;
and custom Perl scripts which we developed. We utilised the scripts to automate
the execution of the tools as well as for compiling statistical data regarding the
system configuration, the environments in which the system is used, and the
manner in which the system is utilised. The AV product is centrally managed
on our server. An AV client installed on the laptops sends relevant information
to the server about any malware detected or suspected infections as they occur.
Before deployment, we benchmarked the laptops by running the diagnostics
tools and recording the output. The information included: a hash of all files plus
information about whether the files were signed; a list of auto-start programs; a
list of processes; a list of registry keys; and a list of browser helper objects.
3.2 Procedure
The study consisted of 5 in-person sessions: an initial session where participants
received their laptop and instructions, followed by monthly 1-2 hour sessions
where we performed analysis to determine if the laptop was infected.
Participants initially purchased the laptops from us at a reduced rate; it was
theirs to keep after the study. To encourage the participants to remain in the
study, we paid them to attend the monthly in-person sessions. If participants
complete all required sessions, the entire cost of the laptop would be reimbursed,
along with an additional honorarium. We encouraged participants to configure
their laptop as they desired and use it as they would normally use their own
computer. The only restrictions applied during the experiment were that the
4participants do not format the hard drive, do not replace the operating system,
and not install any other AV product on the laptop.
Each month, participants booked an appointment via an online calendar
system hosted on our website. During these monthly sessions, participants com-
pleted an online questionnaire about their computer usage and experience, while
the experimenter collected the local data compiled by the automated scripts. The
questionnaire was intended to assess the participant’s experience with the AV
product and gain insights about how the laptop was used.
The data compiled by our scripts included, but was not limited to, the list
of applications installed, the average number of hours per day the laptop is
connected to the Internet, and the number of web sites visited. Diagnostics
tools were also executed on the laptop to determine if infection was suspected.
If the AV product detected any malware over the course of the month, or if
our diagnostics tools indicate that the laptop may be infected, we requested
additional written consent from the participant to collect data that will help us
identify the means and the source of the infection.
Before the last visit, participants completed an online survey about their
experience during the study. The aim of this exit survey was to identify activities
or mindset that may have unduly influenced the experimental results. We chose
to administer the survey apart from the in-person session in case participants
were more comfortable revealing such information while not in the presence
of the experimenter. In the last session, we requested that participants keep
the experiment data stored on their laptops for an additional three months, so
that if we discover that further analysis is necessary, we can contact them and
seek their permission to collect and analyse the relevant data. Nonetheless, we
provided a procedure for deleting the diagnostic tools and the scripts, as well as
the experiment data stored on their laptop. We also explained that residual data
may still remain on the laptop even after the experiment data is deleted. If they
wanted to completely remove all traces of the experiment from their laptop, we
referred them to external resources for re-imaging the laptop.
4 Ethical and Privacy Considerations
This study was reviewed and approved by the Computer Risks Evaluation Board
(CREB) and the Research Ethics Board (REB) of E´cole Polytechnique de Montre´al.
Ethical and privacy guidelines were of particular concern because the experiment
involved the collection of personal data over an extended period of time.
To preserve anonymity, each participant was assigned an identification num-
ber such that the identity of the participant was not linked to any data during
analysis. No personally identifiable information, such as usernames and pass-
words were collected, content of personal documents stored on the computer
were not examined, and no exact URLs were collected (only aggregate data
about categories of web sites such as “social networking” and “gaming”).
Because the study involved malware, necessary precautions were taken to
protect the university’s infrastructure as well as that of the users. For example,
in the event that an infection could not be cleaned by the AV product, we relayed
5the relevant details to the AV company. The company developed and provided
a product update to detect and remove the infection. This update was applied
to participants’ laptops as part of regular automated software updates.
5 Experience to date
The study officially started in November 2011. The first step was to configure the
laptops and meet all 50 participants individually to provide instructions, have
them sign the consent form, and pay for their laptop. As noted earlier, the full
cost of the laptop will be reimbursed, with an additional honorarium, provided
that the participant attends all four monthly visits. Partial reimbursement will
be provided if only some of the sessions are completed.
The study is ongoing. Participants have their laptops and the AV clients have
been communicating with our AV server. Thus far (November 2011), a total of
18 malware incidences have been reported on eight of the laptops. Also, we
know that at least one incidence is an actual infection; the participant informed
us that a program on his laptop requested that he pay money to upgrade his
AV software. The responsible program was confirmed to be a known malicious
scareware that pretends to be legitimate security software [12]. All incidences
will be explored when these participants return for their first monthly session.
The number of incidences in the first month is much higher than anticipated.
This initial spike may be because participants were installing software and cus-
tomizing their computer. We will be closely exploring and analysing the data
collected during the first monthly sessions. It remains to be seen whether this
rate of infection will persist throughout the rest of the study.
Most participants have expressed a high level of willingness to collaborate
and some have even shown scientific interest in the study. Surprisingly, some
participants asked us how they should act to get their laptop infected, to which
we responded that they should use their laptop normally. In the event that
participants need assistance, we provided them a telephone number and an email
address that they could use to contact us. Other than the participant whose
laptop has been infected with malware, only a few participants have contacted
us via email to obtain support, and none of them has contacted us via telephone.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This study is intended to demonstrate what we believe is a more effective way of
evaluating anti-malware products: the main conjecture being that it is imperative
that actual users be involved in the evaluation process, and that they use the
products in realistic environment over an extended period of time. Our study is
in progress, but results so far point to a rich data set that will provide evidence
for how user behaviour and environments of use affects incidences of malware.
We will be analyzing data on a monthly basis to ensure that we are collecting
appropriate data and to determine if any modifications are necessary. Overall,
we intend to perform in-depth statistical analysis to determine whether there
is a correlation between user behaviour and incidences of infection, as well as
probing specific incidences to fully understand the causes of infection.
6We will use our findings to inform a second, larger study examining specific
variables and confirming the results from the first study. This second study
will be designed to determine which factors (i.e. type of AV product or user
behaviour) has the most impact on incidences of infection of a system. It will
compare multiple AV products, more participants will be involved, and the study
will take place over a longer period of time, likely over 6 to 12 months. We hope
the results of this follow-on work will help inform the design of future consumer-
level security products.
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